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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-
103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the district court correctly enter summaryjudgment in favor of 
Howell and DJP on Plaintiffs' fraud claim because Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence 
that they invested in a Ponzi scheme, that Howell knew about or participated in a Ponzi 
scheme, or that Howell defrauded Plaintiffs in any way? (R. 646-4 7.) 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is appropriate only where there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrig. Co., 2011 UT 33,, 18,258 P.3d 
539. A district cou~'s grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and no 
deference is given to the court's legal conclusions. Id. Plaintiffs must prove the 
following elements to sustain their fraud claim: "( 1) that a representation was made 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) ":'hich was false and (4) which_the 
representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, ( 5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to that party's injury and damage." Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 
1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). 
24206987 
Preservation for Appeal: (R. 318-23, 629-33, 646-47.) 
1 
Issue 2: Did the district court correctly enter summary judgment in favor of 
Howell and DJP on Plaintiffs' malpractice claim because Plaintiffs failed to produce 
evidence that they invested in a Ponzi scheme, that Howell knew about or participated in 
a Ponzi scheme, or that Howell owed a duty to Plaintiffs that he breached or that caused 
Plaintiffs' damages? (R. 646-4 7.) 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is appropriate only where there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Big Ditch Irrig. Co., 2011 UT 33, iI 18. A district court's grant of 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and no deference is given to the court's 
legal conclusions. Id. To prove a legal malpractice claim for breach of contract, 
Plaintiffs must prove: "(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) 
performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the express promise by the defendant; and ( 4) 
damages to the plaintiff resulting from the breach." Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App 3 77 
,r 17, 265 P.3d 116 (internal citations, alterations and quotations omitted). To prove a 
legal malpractice claim for breach of a fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs must prove: "(1) an 
attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client; (3) 
causation, both actual and proximate; and ( 4) damages suffered by the client." Roderick 
v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, iJ 29, 54 P.3d 1119. 
Preservation for Appeal: (R. 318-22, 325-27, 629-33, 646-47.) 
Issue 3: Did the district court correctly enter summary judgment in favor of 
Howell and DJP on Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim because Plaintiffs failed to 
produce evidence that they invested in a Ponzi scheme, that Howell knew about or 
2 
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participated in a Ponzi scheme, or that Howell owed Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty that he 
breached or that caused Plaintiffs' damages? (R. 646-4 7.) 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is appropriate only where there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw." Big Ditch lrrig. Co., 2011 UT 33, ~ 18. A district court's grant of 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and no deference is given to the court's 
legal conclusions. Id. To prove a breach of fiduciary duty claim, Plaintiffs must prove: 
(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of a fiduciary duty owed; 
(3) causation, both actual and proximate; and ( 4) damages suffered by the plaintiff. See 
Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313, ~ 22, 142 
P.3d 560 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding~ 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1996)). 
Preservation for Appeal: (R. 318-22, 327, 629-33, 646-47.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2006, Plaintiffs invested $240,000 with a company called Atlas Capital. In 
return, Plaintiffs received a promissory note under which they received monthly returns 
totaling $68,900 over approximately, until the payments eventually stopped. Now they 
claim they were defrauded in an alleged Ponzi scheme. If that is true-and there is no 
evidence that it is-then the persons and entities that induced Plaintiffs to invest in that 
Ponzi scheme should be held liable. But it does not give Plaintiffs a basis to sue their 
estate planning attorney, Andrew Howell, to try to recoup their investment loss. 
3 
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Plaintiffs were referred to Mr. Howell and asked him to set up their estate plan. 
Howell did this, for which he was paid $1,503. Plaintiffs later asked Howell to help them 
form a limited liability company. He did this, for which he was paid $552. Howell 
performed these limited services as Plaintiffs requested and there is no allegation that he 
made any mistakes in doing so. Nevertheless, Howell and his former law firm are sued 
here because the wrongdoers-assuming there were wrongdoers-do not have deep 
enough pockets. 
The evidence is undisputed that Howell had absolutely nothing to do with 
Plaintiffs' investment in Atlas Capital, which Plaintiffs were induced to make solely by 
Plaintiffs' friends and investment advisors. Plaintiffs never asked Howell for investment 
advice and Howell never gave Plaintiffs any investment advice. As an estate planning 
lawyer, Howell is not an investment advisor and never indicated to Plaintiffs that he was. 
To the contrary, Plaintiffs sought and received their investment advice from others. They 
made their investment with others. And it was others who lost their investment. 
Plaintiffs' only baseless theory for holding Howell liable for what turned out to be a bad 
investment is that Plaintiffs' estate planning attorney purportedly should have inserted 
himself into their investment decisions and saved Plaintiffs from themselves. But Howell 
had neither the duty nor the right to meddle in Plaintiffs' investment affairs. 
The district court saw right through Plaintiffs' claims and dismissed them all on 
summary judgment for the same reasons advanced in Mr. Howell's Motion for Summary 
Judgment: Plaintiffs have no evidence to prove Atlas Capital was a Ponzi scheme; 
Plaintiffs have no evidence that Howell knew about or participated in some grand 
4 
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scheme; Howell did not have a duty to protect Plaintiffs from themselves; Plaintiffs 
cannot show that Howell breached any duty; Plaintiffs have no evidence that Howell 
caused Plaintiffs' purported damages; and Plaintiffs have no evidence-and presented no 
argument-to satisfy any of the unique elements of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Nothing has changed on appeal. The Court should affirm the district court's 
judgment because: (I) Plaintiffs have not followed Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 
to establish an issue for review or on which this Court could reverse the lower court; 
(2) Plaintiffs still do not have any admissible evidence that Atlas Capital was a Ponzi 
scheme or that Howell knew about or participated in such a scheme; (3) Plaintiffs offer 
no argument or evidence that Howell owed them a duty that he breached or that caused 
Plaintiffs' purported damages; and ( 4) Plaintiffs do not address-let alone argue or offer 
evidence supporting-any of the unique elements of their three remaining claims against 
Howell. 
A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Investments 
Plaintiffs met Ray Hooper in 2003 when he enrolled his children into the private 
school Plaintiffs owned and operated in Spanish Fork, Utah. (R. 308, 331.) Ray also 
served on the Board of Trustees for Plaintiffs' private school from 2004 until he died in a 
plane crash in June 2006. (Id.) In early 2006, before his passing, Ray told Plaintiffs 
about investments he had made that paid him six percent monthly, and Plaintiffs "had a 
few conversations" with Ray about investing wherein Ray told Plaintiffs "that he was in 
the business of generating large amounts of money for investors." (Id.) Ray told 
5 
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Plaintiffs about "accessing the value of [Plaintiffs'] home to create more value." (R. 308; 
R. 374 at 80:3-8.) Plaintiffs gained the trust and confidence to make their investment 
during these conversations with Ray. (Id.; R. 380 at 104:11-12 (Plaintiffs "confidence 
began with [their] relationship with Ray Hooper").) Ms. Morris later testified: "[We] 
went in in confidence. We went in because of-again, the relationship that we had with 
Ray and the things that, you know, he had talked with us about and the fact that he was 
making a lot of money, we went in believing that this was a new way of looking at 
things." (R. 308-09; R. 383 at 115:13-22.) 
Plaintiffs were scheduled to meet with Ray for an initial financial consultation at 
Engenuity Life Provo, LLC, 1 but Ray died a week before the appointment. (R. 309, 331.) 
A couple weeks later, Plaintiffs contacted Engenuity and requested "to work with 
Cynthia [Clements], Ray's assistant, since she was LDS." (Id.) On July 12, 2006, 
Plaintiffs met for the first of many times with Cynthia at Engenuity. (R. 309, 332.) 
During that meeting, Plaintiffs discussed their "objectives for investing" and their 
concerns, including "Michael's skepticism about investing, and [Susan's] concern about 
not wanting to become materialistic." (Id.; see also R. 434 at 32:7-10 ("Well, it's a big 
investment. You want to make sure it's safe.").) Cynthia told Plaintiffs that they could 
pay $7,500 to attend a Curriculum for Wealth seminar in August 2006, and to have 
Cynthia act as their "personal CEO" for a year. (R. 309,332; R. 362 at 31:7-19.) 
1 The distinction between the multiple Engenuity entities is immaterial to the claims 
against Howell or Howell's defenses. Howell refers to them collectively as "Engenuity." 
6 
24206987 
After that meeting, Plaintiffs called Fremont Woodward, another board member at 
Plaintiffs' private school, because Fremont had been one of Ray's clients before Ray's 
death and since had started working with Cynthia. (R. 309,333; R. 429 at 10:17-11:4.) 
Fremont told Plaintiffs that he had spent $12,000 on financial services the previous year 
but that he had made many times that amount of money back on his investments. (R. 
309, 333; R. 380 at 103:24-104:12.) Plaintiffs understood from this conversation that 
Fremont was satisfied with the investments and that he "thought it was a legitimate 
business." (R. 309-10; R. 429 at 10:20-11:3.) Fremont's experience "was an affirmation 
to [Plaintiffs]" about the investments they were contemplating. (R. 310; R. 380 at 
103 :24-104: I 0.) 
On August 8, 2006, Plaintiffs again met with Cynthia and discussed "Michael[' s] 
concern[] about the safety of the investments." (R. 310, 333.) After that discussion, 
Plaintiffs paid the $7,500 tuition for the Curriculum for Wealth seminar and to have 
Cynthia as their personal CEO, and Plaintiffs also signed up to be members of the 
"Producer Revolution," which entitled them to daily motivational e-mails and a monthly 
newsletter. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs attended the Curriculum for Wealth Seminar at the Provo Marriott Hotel 
from August 10 through August 12, 2006. (Id.) Many speakers spoke on many 
investment-related topics during those days. (R. 310, 334.) Howell was not part of and 
did not participate in that seminar. (Id.; R. 365 at 43:8-9; R. 374 at 77:6.) 
After Plaintiffs attended the seminar, they were willing to follow what the 
Engenuity advisors told them to do. (R. 310; R. 373 at 76:20-24.) 
7 
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Plaintiffs immediately set out on a course to make their investments. (R. 310.) 
The first step in the plan was to make a large investment in Atlas Capital, which they 
would fund using Michael's 40l(k) assets and by taking out mortgages on their home. 
(R. 310.) Cynthia directed Plaintiffs to invest those funds in Atlas Capital. (R. 311; R. 
361 at 25:6-10.) The second step in Plaintiffs' plan was to use some of the interest 
earned on their Atlas Capital investment to pay the premium on new life insurance 
policies. (R. 310.) And the third step was to use additional capital to make real estate 
investments. (R. 310; R. 357 at 10:25-11 :6.) 
Plaintiffs began by acquiring the funds to invest in Atlas Capital. On August 24, 
2006, Plaintiffs "signed the papers to pull $50,993.46 from [Michael's] 40l(k)." (R. 310, 
334.) On October 25, 2006, Plaintiffs met with Kyle Nelson, president of Atlas Capital, 
to ask him about investing with Atlas Capital and to ask him "about the difference 
between a secured and unsecured investment." (R. 310, 335.) The next day, October 26, 
2006, Plaintiffs signed the documents to take out a first and second mortgage on their 
home. (R. 311, 336.) 
Plaintiffs made their investment in Atlas Capital on November 6, 2006, by wiring 
$215,000 to Atlas Capital. (R. 311, 480.) That $215,000 came from the mortgage 
Plaintiffs signed the week before. {Id.) Then, on November 9, 2006, Plaintiffs finished 
funding their investment with Atlas Capital by wiring to Atlas Capital an additional 
$25,000 from Michael's 401(k) savings. (R. 311, 479.) Combined, Plaintiffs invested 
$240,000 in Atlas Capital. (R. 311; R. 479; R 359 at 17:22-18:6.) 
8 
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On December 6, 2006, Plaintiffs began working on Step 3 of their plan by meeting 
with the Ockham Group to discuss real estate investments. (R. 311, 336.) Again, 
Cynthia referred Plaintiffs to the Ockham Group. (Id.) On December 12, 2006, Plaintiffs 
again met with the Ockham Group and paid a $1,250 fee to begin participating in real 
estate investments. (R. 311, 337.) Plaintiffs never made real estate investments. (R. 311, 
364.) 
On December 13, 2006, Susan obtained from Atlas Capital the Promissory Note in 
the name of her trust. (R. 311, 337, 486.) The Promissory Note was a one-year 
agreement requiring Atlas Capital to pay monthly interest payments of $7,200 to 
Plaintiffs and to return the principal sum to Plaintiffs after 12 months, or within 30 days 
of written request by Plaintiffs. (R. 311, 486.) 
On December 15, 2006, Plaintiffs received their first monthly interest payment 
from Atlas Capital-$4,000 for the first partial month of their investment. (R. 312, 482.) 
That same day, Plaintiffs made their first monthly premium payment on their new life 
insurance policies. (Id.; R. 337.) Each month from December 2006 until September 
2007, Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments from Atlas Capital pursuant to the 
Promissory Note. (R. 312; R. 358 at 15:20-24; R. 359 at 18:9-11.) Plaintiffs received an 
additional $100 in September 2007 because Atlas Capital made that month's payment 
late. (R. 312, 3 3 8.) Therefore, over the first 10 months of Plaintiffs' investment with 
Atlas Capital, Plaintiffs' investment returned $68,900 in payments from Atlas Capital to 
Plaintiffs. 
9 
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Plaintiffs did not receive a payment in October 2007 or any month thereafter. (Id.) 
By October 23, 2007, Atlas Capital's payment was eight days late, and Plaintiffs 
"received an important e-mail from Cynthia, telling [them] that [they] should pull [their] 
investment out of Atlas right away." (R. 312, 345.) Plaintiffs did not follow that advice. 
The next day, Plaintiffs met with Matt Randall at Horizon Financial, the company 
through which Plaintiffs had purchased their life insurance policies. Mr. Randall advised 
Plaintiffs to "take at least part of [their] investment out of Atlas Capital" because 
"unsecured loans in holding companies were risky." (Id.) Again, Plaintiffs did not do so. 
Finally, on November 1, 2007, Plaintiffs sent a certified letter to Wade Sleater at ~ 
Atlas Capital calling for the return of their principal within 30 days. (R. 312, 347.) Atlas 
Capital did not return Plaintiffs' principal. (R. 359 at 18:14-23.) 
Plaintiffs suspect, but have no evidence to show, that their Atlas Capital 
investment was a Ponzi scheme, not just an investment that did not work out. (R. 312, 
448.) 
B. Howell's Limited Representation of Plaintiffs 
Andrew Howell was an associate at DJP from 2002 until March 2007. (R. 313 
,r l; R. 589 (not disputing).) Howell's practice focuses on estate planning and business 
structuring. (Id.) His entire practice is referral-based. {Id.) Howell receives referrals 
from many sources, but does not have any agreements or offer reciprocity for those 
referrals. (Id.) 
For example, Cynthia Clements and her husband were referred to Howell. (R. 313 ~ 
,r 2; R. 589 (not disputing).) Howell met with Cynthia and her husband in July 2006 to 
10 
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help them with their estate planning and some corporate structuring work for a janitorial 
business they owned. (Id.) 
However, that was the extent of Howell's relationship with Cynthia. Howell did 
not invest with any of the persons or entities involved in this lawsuit, nor did he ever 
attend or participate in Curriculum for Wealth seminars. (R. 313 ,r 3; R. 506-07 at 19:23-
20:7.) Howell never even discussed those seminars with anyone involved in them. (R. 
313 ,r 3; R. 508 at 21: 15-18.) Howell received no income from Curriculum for Wealth 
seminars. (R. 313 ,r 3; R. 530 at 43: 13-19.) Moreover, Howell had no involvement with, 
and provided no content to, the Producer Revolution. (R. 313 ,r 3; R. 531 at 44:3-10.) 
Howell did not even know Ray Hooper, who presumably would have referred Plaintiffs 
to a different estate planning attorney had he not died in a plane crash. (R. 493 at 6:6-7.) 
Plaintiffs claim they first heard Howell's name during an estate planning 
presentation given by Darren Miller, an insurance agent with Foundations Insurance, at 
the Curriculum for Wealth seminar that Plaintiffs attended in August 2006. (R. 365 at 
43:20-21; R. 430 at 16:6-13; R. 333.) There is no evidence of any connection whatsoever 
between Darrin Miller and Howell, or between Foundations Insurance and Howell. 
There is no evidence about why Darrin Miller provided Howell's name at that August 
2006 seminar. Again, Howell did not attend this or any other Curriculum for Wealth 
seminar, and did not know his name had been provided at the seminar. (R. 507-08 at 
20:2-21 :24.) 
At some point, Cynthia referred Plaintiffs to Howell, and, in early September 
2006, Plaintiffs contacted Howell's secretary and set up an appointment to meet with 
11 
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Howell. (R. 313 ,r 4; R. 589 (not disputing).) Howell did not know in advance that 
Cynthia would refer Plaintiffs to him, or that Plaintiffs asked to meet Howell based on 
Cynthia's referral. (R. 314 ,r 7; R. 590 (not disputing).) Howell later learned from 
Plaintiffs, during his first meeting with them, that Cynthia referred Plaintiffs to Howell. 
(R. 509 at 22:10-13.) Howell did a conflicts check before meeting with Plaintiffs and 
found no conflicts of interest in helping Plaintiffs with their estate. (R. 313 ,r 6; R. 589-
90 ( not disputing).) 
Plaintiffs "had ... decided that [they] were going to make investments prior to the 
time [they] met with Andrew Howell." (R. 313 ,r 5; R. 589 (not disputing).) Howell met ~ 
with Plaintiffs for the first time on September 7, 2006-two weeks after Plaintiffs cashed 
out Michael's 40l(k) to fund Plaintiffs' investment with Atlas Capital. (R. 314 ,r 7; R. 
589-90 (not disputing); R. 310, 334.) During that first meeting, Howell understood that 
Plaintiffs were seeking a "(s]traight-up estate plan." (R. 314 ,r 8; R. 590 (not disputing).) 
He understood from his conversation with Plaintiffs that Cynthia was an insurance agent 
helping Plaintiffs to obtain life insurance, and he had no understanding that there was any 
financial planning or investment component to Plaintiffs' life insurance. (Id.) Howell 
spoke with Plaintiffs about the basics of estate planning, wills, trusts, and powers of 
attorney. (Id.) They also spoke briefly about Plaintiffs' assets-that they owned their 
home, that they already had cashed out their 401(k), and that they were looking to buy 
insurance. (Id.) But Plaintiffs did not indicate what they were doing with their cashed-
out 401(k) funds. (Id.) 
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Plaintiffs knew and understood that Howell's "role was to create wills and trusts 
for [them], again as a protection." (R. 314 ,r 9; R. 591-92 (not disputing); R. 365 at 
41:13-14.) Plaintiffs understood that the protection they sought from Howell was 
"protection against events that may happen in the future, such as death, taxes," etc. (R. 
314 ,r 9; R. 591-92 (not disputing); R. 379 at 100: 11-15; see also R. 431 at 19:4-6 ("Q: 
And the protection would be against things like estate taxes and probate? A: Yeah, 
probate.").) Plaintiffs admit that, at the time of Howell's representation, they did not 
"believe that Mr. Howell was responsible for ensuring that [Plaintiffs] made money 
rather than lost money on [their] investment." (R. 314 ,r 9; R. 591-92 (not disputing); R. 
443 at 66: 1-4.) Plaintiffs did not believe "that the attorney who prepares [their] trust is 
responsible for ensuring the safety and profitability of the asset that is placed in [their] 
trust." (R.314 ,r 9; R. 591-92 (not disputing); R. 443 at 67:9-16.) 
Five days after their first meeting, Howell mailed to Plaintiffs their Engagement 
Letter. (R. 315 ,I 1 0; R. 591 (not disputing).) That Engagement Letter expressly defined 
the "Scope of Services" to be rendered: "You have asked us to provide you with advice 
and assistance in connection with your tax and estate planning." (Id.; see also R. 551.) 
With the Engagement Letter, Howell forwarded drafts of the requested estate planning 
documents, including wills, declarations of trust, powers of attorney, and living wills. 
(Id.) 
Howell did not hear from Plaintiffs again until December 2006. (R. 315 ,r 11; R. 
591 (not disputing).) The next time Howell spoke with Plaintiffs was at their second and 
final meeting, on December 12, 2006. (Id.) 
13 
24206987 
Plaintiffs already had made their Atlas Capital investment and purchased their life 
insurance policies over a month before this second meeting with Howell. (R. 315 ,r 12; 
R. 591 (not disputing); see also R. 311, 480 (Plaintiffs funded Atlas Capital investment 
36 days before second meeting with Howell).) 
During the December 12 meeting, Plaintiffs signed their estate planning 
documents that Howell prepared for them. (R. 315 ,r 13; R. 590-91 (not disputing).) 
They also talked in more detail about Plaintiffs' assets and what should be put in 
Plaintiffs' trusts for purposes of avoiding probate. (Id.) Plaintiffs mentioned for the first 
time taking money out of the equity of their home to make investments. (Id.) They told 
Howell they already had made one investment "and there was going to be a promissory 
note that evidenced the investment." (Id.) Howell suggested that the ·Promissory Note-
which Plaintiffs had not received and which Howell had not seen-be put in the name of 
Susan's trust to avoid probate. (Id.) The first time Howell saw the Promissory Note was 
when Susan sent it to him on December 22, 2006-nine days after she received it. (R. 
315 ,r 14; R. 590-91 (not disputing); see also R. 311, 337, 486.) 
During that final meeting on December 12, Plaintiffs told Howell that, based on 
Cynthia's advice, they wanted his help "to set up Morris Management LLC for real estate 
investing." (R. 316 ,r 15; R. 591 (not disputing).) Howell did as Plaintiffs requested and 
formed Morris Management LLC for Plaintiffs. (Id.) 
For his work on Plaintiffs' estate planning, Plaintiffs paid Howell $1,503. (R. 316 
,r 16; R. 591 (not disputing).) For his work forming Morris Management LLC, Plaintiffs ~ 
14 
24206987 
paid Howell $552. (Id.) Howell performed no additional paid services for Plaintiffs. 
(Id.) 
C. Plaintiffs Did Not Seek, and Howell Did Not Provide, Investment 
Advice. 
Howell is an estate planning attorney and never offers investment advice to any 
client, including Plaintiffs. (R. 316 ,r 17; R. 591-92 (not disputing); R. 529 at 42:15-16.) 
Howell did not direct Plaintiffs to Atlas Capital or tell them they should invest with Atlas 
Capital. (R. 316 ,r 18; R. 591 (not disputing).) Howell never advised Plaintiffs to make 
the Atlas Capital investment or to purchase insurance policies. (R. 316 ,r 20; R. 591 (not 
disputing).) 
Howell never told Plaintiffs that Atlas Capital was a good investment. (R. 316 
,r 19; R. 591 (not disputing).) Plaintiffs never asked Howell to analyze the investment to 
determine whether it was good or bad. (R. 317,r 25; R. 591 (not disputing).) Plaintiffs 
never discussed with Howell whether their investment was good or bad, high risk or low 
risk, because they already had asked both Engenuity and Atlas Capital those questions 
and Plaintiffs believed what they had been told by their investment advisors-that the 
investment was low risk. (R. 317 ,r 26; R. 591 (not disputing).) Howell never talked 
about what the rate of return would or could be on Plaintiffs' investments. (R. 317 ,r 23; 
R. 591 (not disputing).) Howell and Plaintiffs never discussed how Atlas Capital would 
invest Plaintiffs' money, nor is there any evidence that Howell ever knew what 
investments Atlas Capital made, or how Atlas Capital handled its investors' money. (R. 
317 ,r 24; R. 591 (not disputing).) 
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Howell never was present during any of Plaintiffs' meetings with Engenuity or 
Atlas Capital. (R. 317,I 27; R. 591 (not disputing).) Plaintiffs never discussed the 
principal sum of the investment, $240,000, with Howell. (R. 316 ,I 22; R. 591 (not 
disputing).) And Plaintiffs never discussed the terms of the Promissory Note with 
Howell. (R. 316 ,I 21; R. 591-92 (not disputing).) (R. 316 ,I 21; R. 591-92 (not 
disputing).) Indeed, the only evidence is that Howell may have learned of the terms of 
the Promissory Note after Plaintiffs supplied it to him on December 22, 2006-nine days 
after Susan received it and 46 days after Plaintiffs made their Atlas Capital investment. 
{Id.; see also R. 311, 337, 480, 486.) 
Plaintiffs admit they did not go to Howell, an estate planning attorney, for 
investment advice. (R. 317 ,I 28; R. 591 (not disputing).) Plaintiffs never told Howell 
they were relying on him for investment advice. (R. 317129; R. 591 (not disputing).) 
Plaintiffs admit they still would have lost their money even if they had not done their 
estate plan with Howell. (R. 317 ,I 30; R. 591 (not disputing).) 
D. This Lawsuit 
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in August 2009, alleging six causes of action 
against 23 defendants. (R. 1.) In February 2011, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Verified 
Complaint (the "Verified Complaint") alleging the same six causes of action. (R. 132-
56.) All of the allegations in the Verified Complaint are prefaced by Plaintiffs' 
admission that Plaintiffs "allege as follows." (R. 132). The Verified Complaint is 
followed by a "Verification" that reads in its entirety: "Michael Morris, Plaintiff herein, ~ 
by his signature below, verifies that the information contained in this Verified Complaint 
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is true and correct, to the best of his knowledge." (R. 156 (emphasis added).) Susan did 
not sign or otherwise verify the Verified Complaint. 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims against 19 defendants from 
whom Plaintiffs decided they could not collect, including against the Engenuity, Horizon, 
and Atlas Capital defendants. (R. 677; R. 732; R. 740-41.) 
Following extensive discovery, and almost five years after the case commenced, 
Howell moved for summary judgment against all six of Plaintiffs' claims (the "Motion"). 
(R. 303.) In his Motion and supporting memorandum, Howell cited extensively to the 
evidentiary record and argued that the undisputed facts proved that Howell did not owe 
Plaintiffs a duty to protect them from their own investment decisions, that Howell did not 
breach any duty that he owed to Plaintiffs, and that Howell did not cause Plaintiffs' 
investment loss. (R. 306-322.) Howell also demonstrated that each of Plaintiffs' six 
causes of action against Howell failed based on a complete lack of evidence supporting 
the specific elements of those causes of action. (R. 322-27.) 
Plaintiffs filed their memorandum opposing Howell's Motion in August 2014 
("Plaintiffs' Opposition"). (R. 588-97.) The district court correctly characterized 
Plaintiffs' Opposition as "consist[ing] of a statement of facts and a summary of [ one 
criminal case,] State v. Bolson," with "[n]o argument ... presented to the Court." (R. 
646; see also R. 588-97.) As to the statement of facts in Plaintiffs' Opposition, Plaintiffs 
did not address or dispute most of the undisputed facts in Howell's Motion, Plaintiffs 
failed to cite any evidence in support of some contentions, Plaintiffs cited deposition 
testimony that largely did not support Plaintiffs' assertions, and Plaintiffs added 
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"additional facts" that were unrelated to Howell or his Motion. (See R. 589-95; see also 
R. 628-34.) Plaintiffs' Opposition also abandoned three of Plaintiffs' causes of action 
against Howell (for "securities fraud," for "violation of the Utah consumer protection 
laws," and for "violation of the Utah deceptive trade practices laws"). (R. 596, 629.) 
After lengthy oral argument (R. 675-712), the district court issued its Ruling 
granting Howell's Motion and dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 642-50.) The 
district court recognized that "it is not the duty of the Court to contrive an argument or 
hunt for evidence in support of an argument" when Plaintiffs' failed to do so in their 
Opposition, yet the district court still took the initiative after oral argument to "review[] 
the briefs, arguments, and evidence, including depositions, submitted by the parties." (R. 
643, 646; see also R. 711-12 at 37:23-38:2 (Judge Taylor stating at hearing that he would 
''take it under advisement" and "go through [the evidence] again very carefully"). After 
all of this effort, the district court could not find any evidence to create a genuine dispute 
of material fact, or that could support Plaintiffs' claims against Howell. (R. 642-47.) 
The district court correctly held that "the Morrises fail[ ed] to present evidence which 
establishes that Howell made representations about the investments, breached the 
contract for estate planning and business formation services, owed the Morrises a 
fiduciary duty in regards to the failed investment, or engaged in malpractice." (R. 646.) 
Next, the district court held that "[t]he Morrises have failed to present evidence that 
Howell owed the Morrises a duty beyond the scope of the parties' contract, that Howell 
committed malpractice when he created the Morris estate plan and LLC, or that a conflict ~ 
of interest was present." (R. 646.) Importantly, the district court also correctly ruled that 
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"[t]here is not a single issue of material fact which demonstrates that Howell was 
involved in a fraudulent misrepresentation or conspiracy." (R. 646-47.) 
On appeal, Plaintiffs seek to resurrect only their "claim[s for] fraud, contract 
breach, breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice." (Aplt's Br. at 4.)2 The only 
substantive differences between Plaintiffs' Opposition to Howell's Motion that was 
before the district court and Plaintiffs' Brief of Appellants before this Court are: ( 1) 
Plaintiffs' appeal brief adds 42 new "statement of facts" paragraphs that are copied and 
pasted from Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint and that cite solely to the Verified Complaint 
for evidentiary support (see Aplt's Br. ,r,r 1-2, 6-41, 43-44, 46-47); and (2) Plaintiffs' 
appeal brief contains three new "statement of facts" paragraphs that contain no citations 
to the appellate record or to any evidence at all (see Aplt's Br. ,r,r 5, 45, 49). Plaintiffs' 
appeal brief still contains only a summary of a single irrelevant criminal case, State v. 
Bolton, with no argument, no analysis of the elements of Plaintiffs' claims, and no 
application of the facts of this case to the standards and laws required to prove Plaintiffs' 
claims. In short, Plaintiffs fail to carry their burden and their appeal should be denied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Howell on all of 
Plaintiffs claims, and the Court can and should affirm summary judgment against 
Plaintiffs' claims for four reasons. 
2 Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint does not contain a breach of contract claim and Plaintiffs 
cannot assert a new claim on appeal. Moreover, Plaintiffs' appeal brief does not mention 
a contract between Plaintiffs and Howell, or make any argument or evidentiary showing 
that Howell breached a contractual duty. Therefore, Plaintiffs really ask this court to 
reinstate three claims: fraud, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
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First, Plaintiffs' appeal brief fails to put forth any admissible evidence or even 
argument or reasoning for this Court to overturn the district court's summary judgment, 
and Plaintiffs' failures to comply with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 are so 
substantial that Plaintiffs essentially dump the burden of argument, research and reason 
on this Court. Because Plaintiffs have failed to identify or address the issues for review, 
or any bases for the Court to review the judgment of the lower court, this Court can and 
should decline to reach the merits of Plaintiffs' appeal and should assume the correctness 
of the judgment below. This Court need not and should not do for Plaintiffs what 
Plaintiffs failed to do for themselves. 
Second, after eight years of litigation, Plaintiffs still have no admissible evidence 
to prove the most basic allegations underlying all of their claims, namely that Atlas 
Capital purportedly was a Ponzi scheme, and that Howell allegedly knew about and 
participated in that scheme. The only evidence to which Plaintiffs cite for these and most 
of their assertions is Plaintiffs' own Verified Complaint. But Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint does not qualify as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes because it is 
not made on personal knowledge, does not set out facts that would be admissible in 
evidence, and does not show that Mr. Morris-the sole affiant-is competent to testify on 
the matters stated. The Verified Complaint is filled with unsupported allegations and 
unfounded conclusions, which are not evidence and cannot be used to defeat summary 
judgment. 
Third, Plaintiffs do not even address-let alone offer evidence or argument in 
support of-basic elements of Plaintiffs claims, including duty, breach and causation. 
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Howell showed on summary judgment that Plaintiffs had no evidence to prove duty, 
breach or causation. (R. 318-22.) The district court agreed. (R. 646-47.) On appeal, 
Plaintiffs' continued silence on these crucial elements is an admission that they have no 
evidence, and that they never can prove, that Howell breached a duty that caused 
Plaintiffs' purported damages. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs still offer no evidence or argument to support the unique 
elements of their three remaining claims against Howell. Plaintiffs do not even identify 
the elements of those claims or cite a single authority relating to those claims. Plaintiffs 
cannot point to a single fraudulent representation made by Howell, let alone offer 
evidence of any of the other eight elements of Plaintiffs' fraud claim. Plaintiffs do not 
even try to argue that Howell did anything wrong, let alone something rising to the level 
of malpractice. And Plaintiffs still have not identified what fiduciary duty Howell 
purportedly breached, let alone set out evidence to prove such a breach. 
The Court can and should affirm the district court on any one----or all----of these 
bases. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. APP. P. 24, AND 
THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE DISTRICT COURT 
CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In deciding Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court went well 
beyond what was required of it, and did much more than this Court should do. After 
Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief that "consist[ ed] of a statement of facts and a summary 
of [ one criminal case]" with "no argument ... presented to the Court" (R. 646), the 
21 
24206987 
district court took it upon itself to comb through the record to determine whether any 
evidence supported Plaintiffs' claims against Howell. (R. 643, 646; R. 711-12 at 37:23-
38:2.) After all of this effort, the district court did not find any evidence to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact to support Plaintiffs' claims against Howell. (R. 642-47.) 
On appeal, Plaintiffs' brief again consists of a statement of facts, the same long 
quote from the same criminal case, and no argument presented to the Court. Plaintiffs 
essentially ask this Court to waste its limited time and resources to try to figure out 
Plaintiffs' case for them. Plaintiffs' brief does not comply with Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Court should decline to reach the merits ( or lack 
thereof) of Plaintiffs' appeal, and instead should assume the correctness of the district 
court's judgment. 
Rule 24 exists for a reason: to "focus the briefs, thus promoting more accuracy 
and efficiency in the processing of appeals." Bums v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 
(Utah Ct.App. 1996) ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]his court [has] 
emphasized the importance of the rule in contributing to the efficiency of the court, 
noting that if the court is not supplied with the proper tools to decide cases, then 
extremely valuable time, already severely rationed, must be diverted from substantive 
work into less productive tasks." Id. ( alterations, citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). This Court "is not simply a depository in which the appealing. party may dump 
the burden of argument and research." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Child v. Gonda, 
972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998) (same). Yet that is exactly what Plaintiffs have done. 
22 
24206987 
The consequences of not following Rule 24 are severe. This Court "may decline 
to reach the merits of an issue 'when the overall analysis of the issues is so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court."' Van Den Eikhofv. 
Vista School, 2012 UT App 125, ,r 2,278 P.3d 622 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998)); see also State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ,r 22, 128 P.3d 1179 ("we may 
refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues" (citing Utah R. App'. P. 24)). 
"[W]hen [ the Court of Appeals] decline[ s] to reach the merits of a case due to inadequate 
briefing, [it] 'assume[s] the correctness of the judgment below."' Van Den Eikhof, 2012 
UT App 125, ,-r 2 (quoting English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613,619 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991) ). Where, as here, the deviations from Rule 24 are "so substantial as to 
significantly imped the court's ability to readily grasp the facts of record, the issues on 
appeal, the way in which those issues were preserved for appeal, the governing standards 
of review, and the legal authorities that the appellant believes warrant some relief," the 
Court's "prerogative should not be exercised inconsistently or unpredictably, but more or 
less automatically." Van Den Eikhof, 2012 UT App 125, ,r 4 (emphasis added).3 
Plaintiffs' appellate brief is deficient in at least four significant ways. First, Rule 
24(a)(9) requires that the appellants' brief contain an argument section that "shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) ( emphasis added). "[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority 
3 Rule 24(k) also states that "[b ]riefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer." Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
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but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305; see also Van Den Eikhof, 2012 UT App 125, ~ 2 (same). 
Plaintiffs' brief does no such thing. It cites a single ·criminal case concerning a Ponzi 
scheme, but contains no argument or analysis for how that case could or should apply 
here. Aplt's Br. at 19. Plaintiffs do not cite or even refer to the d!strict court's reasoned 
analysis or ruling on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' terse argument does not refer to any 
of Plaintiffs' claims-or any of the elements of those claims-against Howell. Plaintiffs 
do not cite any authorities in support of or even relating to Plaintiffs' claims-or any of 
the elements of those claims-against Howell. And Plaintiffs' argument section 
continues to ignore all of the specific arguments Howell made on summary judgment on 
which the district court ruled in Howell's favor, including that Plaintiffs have no evidence 
to prove that Atlas Capital was a Ponzi scheme, that Howell knew about or participate in 
such a scheme, or any of the elements of Plaintiffs' claims against Howell. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs do not mention Howell once in their argument section. Plaintiffs did not make 
an argument to the Court, and the Court should not make an argument for them. 
Second, Rule 24(a)(5) requires a "statement of the issues presented for review, 
including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Plaintiffs' presentation of a single issue for review is 
insufficient and amounts to nothing more than a question of whether the district court got 
it wrong-without defining what "it" is. Aplt' s Br. at 3. The district court performed a 
-~ 
detailed inquiry and analysis, and made specific rulings leading to its summary judgment C&.; 
order, all of which Plaintiffs ignore. The district court found that there was no evidence 
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of a Ponzi scheme, no evidence that Howell knew about or participated in a Ponzi 
scheme, and no evidence to support any of the elements of any of Plaintiffs' claims 
against Howell. (R. 643-47.) Yet Plaintiffs remain silent on these issues, do not raise 
them as issues for this Court's review, and do not present any standards or reasons for 
reviewing those rulings. These failures violate Rule 24(a)(5). 
Third, Rule 24(a)(5)(A) requires the appellant to include, for each issue on appeal, 
a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Plaintiffs completely fail to cite to the record showing that any 
issues were preserved in the trial court. See Aplt's Br. at 3-4. In fact, Plaintiffs' did not 
preserve most of the relevant issues in the district court that this Court would have to 
decide to overturn summary judgment. Howell's summary judgment motion showed that 
Plaintiffs had no evidence to prove a duty, to prove a breach, to prove causation, or to 
prove any of the other specific elements of Plaintiffs' fraud, malpractice or fiduciary duty 
claims. (R. 318-23, 325-27.) In opposing that motion, Plaintiffs offered no argument or 
evidence concerning any of those elements. (R. 588-97.) The district court ruled in 
Howell's favor on each element. (R. 643-47.) Yet, on appeal, Plaintiffs still offer no 
argument or evidence concerning-and do not even mention-any of these elements on 
which Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. Plaintiffs do not cite to the record to show that 
these issues were preserved for appeal, and Plaintiffs have never tried to preserve these 
issues. On the contrary, Plaintiffs have abandoned these issues at every turn.4 
4 To preserve an issue for appeal, Plaintiffs had to raise it before the district court by 
"introduc[ing] 'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority."' Badger v. Brooklyn 
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Fourth, Rule 24(a)(7) mandates that "[a]ll statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Plaintiffs did not do this. Instead, . 
Plaintiffs include entire paragraphs of so-called facts without a single record citation. See 
Aplt's Br.~~ 5, 45, 49. And, as shown in Section II.A, infra, 42 of Plaintiffs' remaining 
46 "fact" paragraphs are nearly verbatim recitations from Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint 
that Plaintiffs did not present to the district court and for which Plaintiffs cite solely to the 
Verified Complaint for support, even though the Verified Complaint is not admissible 
evidence. Plaintiffs do not cite any admissible record evidence for 45 of their 49 fact 
paragraphs because there is no admissible record evidence supporting even the most basic 
elements of Plaintiffs' claims. As the district court did, this Court could pour through the 
record and still would never find evidence to support Plaintiffs' claims. But that was 
Plaintiffs' Rule 24 duty, not this Court's. 
Plaintiffs' violations of Rule 24 are "not merely technical, but rather [are] so 
substantial as to significantly impede the court's ability to readily grasp the facts of 
record, the issues on appeal, the way in which those issues were preserved for appeal, the 
governing standards of review, and the legal authorities that [Plaintiffs] believe[] warrant 
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 
945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct.App. 1997)); see also In re Guardianship of A.T.I.G .. 2012 
UT 88, ,r 26, 293 P.3d 276 (issue must be raised "and supported with evidence or relevant 
legal authority"). Issues not preserved with evidence and argument below are deemed 
waived. See Badger, 966 P.2d 844, 847; Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ~[ 12,266 
P.3d 828. "Orderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and 
his theory or theories of recovery to the trial court." Simpson v. Gen. Motors Corp .. 470 
P.2d 399,401 (Utah 1970); see also Patterson, 201 l UT 68, ~ 15 (same). 
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some relief." Van Den Eikhof, 2012 UT App 125, ,r 4. Therefore, this Court's 
"prerogative should not be exercised inconsistently or unpredictably, but more or less 
automatically," and the Court should decline to reach the merits of Plaintiffs' appeal and 
instead should assume the correctness of the judgment below. Id. ,r,r 2, 4. 
II. PLAINTIFFS OFFER NO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THEY 
INVESTED IN A "PONZI SCHEME," MUCH LESS THAT 
HOWELL KNEW ABOUT OR PARTICIPATED IN IT. 
"A summary judgment movant, on an issue where the nonmoving party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its burden on summary judgment by showing by 
reference to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis 
v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 18, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
"Upon such a showing, whether or not supported by additional affirmative factual 
evidence, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). "[T]he 
nonmoving party must submit admissible evidence and demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment." Bowers v. Call, 2011 UT 
App 143, ,r 2,257 P.3d 433 (emphasis added). The nonmoving party must submit such 
evidence for all of "the elements of the claim" that have been challenged. Shaw Res., 
2006 UT App 313, ,r 22 (quoting Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ,r 
35, 54 P.3d 1054)). Then the court "must consider each element of the claim under the 
appropriate standard of proof." Shaw Res., 2006 UT App 313, ,r 22 ( quoting Andalex 
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Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct.App. 1994)). "A plaintiffs failure to 
present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would establish any one of the 
[elements] of the prima facie case justifies a grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant." Stevens-Henager Coll. v. Eagle Gate Coll., 2011 UT App 37,, 14,248 P.3d 
1025 ( alteration in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence 
that they invested in a "Ponzi scheme," that Howell knew about or participated in the 
alleged Ponzi scheme, that Howell breached any duty that caused Plaintiffs' damages, or 
that could establish any of the specific elements of Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 643-47.) 
Although Plaintiffs' new strategy on appeal is to try to create factual disputes by citing to 
their Verified Complaint, Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint is not admissible evidence and 
Plaintiffs still have no evidence to prove any element of their claims against Howell. 
A. Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint Is Not An Admissible Affidavit 
and Is Not Evidence. 
Plaintiffs' appeal brief adds 42 new "statement of facts" paragraphs that are copied 
and pasted from Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. (See Aplt's Br. 11 1-2, 6-41, 43-44, 46-
47.) Contained within those 42 paragraphs are scores of allegations that Plaintiffs would 
have to prove with admissible evidence to be able to prevail on any of their claims 
against Howell, but for which Plaintiffs cite solely to their Verified Complaint. (See id.) 
For example, Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint is their sole "evidence" in support of their 
underlying assertions that they "lost hundreds of thousands of dollars based on 
Appellees' schemes and deceptions," and that "Appellees' Ponzi scheme was an 
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elaborate one in which each of the Appellees reinforced each of the other Appellees' vital 
role in the scheme" through "continuous [efforts] designed and having the effect of 
legitimizing the scheme." (Id. 11 1, 2.) But Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint is not 
admissible evidence, cannot create a genuine dispute on summary judgment, and should 
be ignored by the Court. 
A verified pleading may be considered evidence only if it is the equivalent of an 
affidavit, and a verified pleading is the equivalent of an affidavit only if it meets the 
requirements established in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4). See, e.g., Pentecost v. 
Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985) ("A verified pleading, made under oath and 
meeting the requirements for affidavits established in Rule 56[(c)(4)] of the Utah Rules 
of civil Procedure, can be considered the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a 
motion for summary judgment."); Campbell. Maack & Sessions v. Debry. 200 l UT App 
397, 117 n.4, 38 P.3d 984 (same). 
Rule 56(c)(4) requires that "[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose 
a motion must be made on personal knowledge, must set out facts that would be 
admissible in evidence, and must show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify 
on the matters stated." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added);5 see also Sunridge 
Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2013 UT App 146,127,305 P.3d 171 (An affidavit 
"cannot be used to place before the court inadmissible evidence ... about which [the 
affiant] has demonstrated no independent personal knowledge."); D&L Supply v. Saurini, 
5 On October 22, 2014, when the district court entered summary judgment, these same 
requirements were found in Rule 56( e ), which subsequently was amended and 
renumbered as Rule 56( c )( 4 ). 
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775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) ("[I]nadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment."). 
Utah courts routinely hold that affidavits are inadmissible and cannot be used to 
create disputed facts if the affidavits contain mere allegations, unsubstantiated opinions, 
unsupported factual or legal conclusions, or conjecture. See, e.g., Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. 
v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r 54, 13 P.3d 581 ("An affidavit that merely reflects 
the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of fact."); Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ,r 16, 192 P.3d 
858 (same); Sunridge, 2013 UT App 146, ,r,r 11, 28 ("allegations of a pleading," "factual ~ 
conclusions of an affidavit," "mere conclusions" and "conjecture" cannot raise a genuine 
issue of fact and are insufficient to establish a prima facie case); Barnhart v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2011 UT App 87, ,r 4,250 P.3d 1015 (upholding summary judgment because 
plaintiff "merely relied on his own unsubstantiated allegations and conclusions," which 
was "insufficient to controvert a motion for summary judgment"); Brown v. Jorgensen, 
2006 UT App 168, ,r 20, 136 P.3d 1252 (affidavit "must be based on the personal 
knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by the trial court if largely based on 
unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs"); Fenn v. Redmond Venture, Inc., 2004 
UT App 355, ,r 12, 101 P.3d 387 (upholding refusal to consider affidavits at summary 
judgment that "merely echoe[d], without providing any support for, the complaint's 
allegation," and "as such, rest[ ed] upon the mere allegations found in the complaint and 
fail[ed] to raise factual issues"); Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, ,r 7, 18 P.3d 1137 
("Conclusory affidavits that contain only unsubstantiated belief rather than personal 
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knowledge are insufficient to defeat summary judgment."). 
In particular, statements made "on information or belief' do not meet the Rule 
56(c)(4) standard and must be ignored by the court. See, e.g .• Walker v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation Corp .• 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 538 (1973) ("Statements made merely 
on information and belief will be disregarded."); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 
748 (Utah 1985) ("[A]n affidavit on information and belief is insufficient to provoke a 
genuine issue of fact."). 
Therefore, Utah courts reject verified pleadings that do not satisfy Rule 56(c)(4)'s 
requirements. For example, in Pentecost, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned and held as 
follows: 
In the present case, neither verified pleading satisfied the criteria 
of Rule 56[(c)(4)]. For example, neither verification stated that 
the facts set forth in the pleading were true and correct to the 
personal knowledge of the signer. Both attempted to verify the 
entire contents of the pleading, not just the factual assertions, 
and both impermissibly added 'information' and/or 'belief' to 
personal knowledge as a basis for the verification. In addition, 
some of the facts sworn to were not specific evidentiary facts at 
all, but were mere assumptions or conclusions. 
Pentecost, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (emphasis added)6; see also Campbell, Maack & Sessions, 
200 I UT App 397, ~ 17 n.4 ( concluding that defendant's counterclaim "does not qualify" 
as a verified pleading to defeat summary judgment in part because ''we have reviewed the 
verified counterclaim and conclude that it does not conform with the requirements set 
6 In the end, the Pentecost Court considered the verified complaint, despite its 
deficiencies, because no party had objected to its use when presented to the lower court, 
thereby waiving the objection. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs did not rely on their Verified 
Complaint in opposing summary judgment before the district court but do so for the first 
time on appeal. Therefore, Howell's objection is timely. 
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forth in rule 56[(c)(4)]"); Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1019 (10th Cir. 
2002) (upholding refusal to consider verified pleading as an affidavit because it was 
conclusory, did not state facts underlying opinions, and "did little more than state a legal 
conclusion"); Peck v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 2:l l-CV-611, 2012 WL 1095469, *1 
(D. Utah Mar. 30, 2012) (complaint did not constitute affidavit at summary judgment 
because it started with "Plaintiff alleges," was not based on personal knowledge and did 
not specify basis for that knowledge). 
Here, Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint likewise fails to satisfy the Rule 56(c)(4) 
affidavit standards, and should be ignored by the Court. 7 As in Peck, all of the 
allegations in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint impermissibly are prefaced with the 
admission that Plaintiffs "complain" and "allege as follows." (R. 132 (emphasis added).) 
As in Pentecost, Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint improperly "attempted to verify the entire 
contents of the pleading, not just the factual assertions." (R. 156.) As in Pentecost, 
Walker and Treloggan, Mr. Morris impermissibly attempted to verify all of Plaintiffs' 
allegations not on his own personal knowledge but based on his information and belief, 
or, as he put it, "to the best ofhis knowledge." (R. 156.) And, as in each of the cases 
7 Because the Verified Complaint does not qualify as an affidavit, the Court should 
ignore every "fact" paragraph that relies on it as evidence. This includes paragraphs 1-2, 
6-41, 43-44, and 46-47. In addition, the Court should ignore the three fact paragraphs-
paragraphs 5, 45, and 49-for which Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority. See, e.g., Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l) (factual assertions must be supported by citations to the evidentiary 
record); W. Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ~ 33, 135 P.3d 874 (appellate courts 
"need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by the 
record" (alterations, emphasis, citations, and internal quotations marks omitted)). 
Plaintiffs' remaining four fact paragraphs do not come close to proving a cause of action 
against Howell. 
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cited in this section-and contrary to Rule 56( c )( 4)' s requirements-Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint is filled with mere allegations, unsubstantiated opinions, unsupported factual 
or legal conclusions, and conjecture-not factual, admissible evidence based on 
Plaintiffs' personal knowledge about which Plaintiffs are competent to testify. 
In moving for summary judgment, Howell showed that Plaintiffs have no evidence 
to prove the elements of their claims, or even the underlying allegations that Atlas Capital 
was a Ponzi scheme or that Howell knew about or participated in that scheme. (R. 306-
327.) Plaintiffs may believe they invested in a Ponzi scheme and that Howell 
participated in that scheme, but in opposing Howell's motion for summary judgment, and 
after years of discovery, Plaintiffs' belief no longer sufficed and Plaintiffs bore the 
burden of putting forth evidence to prove their claims. Plaintiffs' failure to carry that 
burden is fatal to Plaintiffs' claims, and the unsupported allegations in Plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint cannot save Plaintiffs' claims. 
B. Plaintiffs Have No Evidence They Invested In a Ponzi Scheme. 
Plaintiffs cannot point to any admissible evidence to show that Atlas Capital was a 
Ponzi scheme. "A Ponzi scheme is a 'fraudulent investment scheme in which money 
contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for the original 
investors, whose example attracts even larger investments."' State v. Wallace, 2005 UT 
App 434, 12 n.l, 124 P.3d 259 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (7th ed. 
1999)). Even on appeal Plaintiffs have not tried to show that the money they ( or other 
investors) invested in Atlas Capital was used to generate artificially high dividends for 
the original investors whose example attracted even larger investments. 
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In fact, Plaintiffs admit that they do not have evidence that their investment in 
Atlas Capital was a fraudulent investment, or anything other than an investment that did 
not work out as Plaintiffs hoped. (See, e.g., R. 448 87:5-10 ("Q: I'm just wondering if 
you have any information that leads you to believe that Atlas Capital lost your money 
simply because their investments went bad or was it worse than that? Were they stealing 
the money, in fact; do you know? A: I don't know for sure, no.").) 
The record evidence shows that Plaintiffs' investment-the $240,000 Promissory 
Note with Atlas Capital-initially was a good investment from which Plaintiffs received 
10 monthly payments totaling $68,900. (See, e.g., R. 482, 337-38, 486.) There is no 
evidence concerning why those payments stopped, let alone that they stopped because 
Atlas Capital was a Ponzi scheme or a fraudulent investment. 
Instead of putting forth admissible evidence to prove their allegations of a Ponzi 
scheme, Plaintiffs offer a single, conclusory statement that if they are permitted to 
proceed to trial they can "prove a scheme to defraud the Morrises, similar to the one 
described in State v. Bolson, 167 P.3d 539, ,r,r 2-4 (Utah App. 2007)." See Aplt's Br. at 
19. But, as the language quoted by Plaintiffs shows, Bolson was a criminal case where a 
Ponzi scheme was found precisely because the evidence established "a fraudulent 
investment scheme in which money contributed by later investors generates artificially 
high dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger 
investments." See id. (quoting Bolson, 2007 UT App 268, 14). In contrast, the fatal 
flaw in Plaintiffs' case is that they only speculate that they invested in such a scheme, but ~ 
they still have no evidence to show that it was anything other than another investment 
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that did not perform as anticipated during this "Great Recession" period. Plaintiffs' 
entire case hinges on the existence of a scheme for which they have no proof. 
C. Plaintiffs Have No Evidence Howell Knew About or Participated 
in a Ponzi Scheme. 
Plaintiffs also have no evidence that Howell knew about or participated in a Ponzi 
scheme. There is no evidence that Howell knew about Engenuity' s business model or the 
investment advice Engenuity provided to its clients. There is no evidence that Howell 
knew about the investment advice or strategies offered at the Curriculum for Wealth 
seminars. There is no evidence Howell knew about Atlas Capital's business, 
investments, operations, or dealings with its clients, including Plaintiffs. There is no 
evidence that Howell even knew about Plaintiffs' investment with Atlas Capital until 
more than a month after Plaintiffs made that investment. (R. 315 ,r 12; R. 591 (not 
disputing); see also R. 311, 480.) Perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence that 
Howell-as opposed to Plaintiffs' friends and investment advisors-in any way induced 
Plaintiffs to enter into their investment. The evidence is directly to the contrary. 
The truth is, Plaintiffs seek to hold Howell guilty by association-and a very 
tenuous association at that. First, Plaintiffs note that the same person (Cynthia) who 
referred Plaintiffs to Atlas Capital also referred Plaintiffs to Andrew Howell for estate 
planning purposes. If such tenuous relationships could saddle an attorney with liability, 
no attorney could afford to take a client by referral. Nevertheless, this fact does not and 
cannot show that Atlas Capital was a Ponzi scheme, that Howell knew it was a Ponzi 
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scheme, that Howell participated in a scheme, or that Howell did anything other than help 
his clients set up estate plans after they were referred to him by a former client. 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that "Howell knew before the Morrises did that Atlas 
Capital was giving them an unsecured promissory note for their 'investment."' Aplt's Br. 
at 15 ,I 42. But the only evidence Plaintiffs cite for this proposition is the testimony of 
Susan Morris, which says only that, at the second meeting in December 2006, Howell 
"knew that we were getting a Promissory Note before we did." (Id.); see also R. 366 at 
48:1-2.) There is no evidence Howell knew Plaintiffs' would be getting an unsecured 
promissory note before Plaintiffs provided it to him ten days after that meeting and nine 
days after Susan Morris signed the Promissory Note. (R. 315 ,I 14; R. 590-91 (not 
disputing); see also R. 311, 337, 486.) Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that 
Plaintiffs met with Kyle Nelson, president of Atlas Capital, more than six weeks earlier to 
discuss the Atlas Capital investment and to ask him "about the difference between a 
secured and unsecured investment." (R. 310, 335.) And, importantly, Plaintiffs already 
had made their Atlas Capital investment and purchased their life insurance policies over a 
month before this second meeting with Howell in December 2006. (R. 315 ,I 12; R. 591 
(not disputing); see also R. 311, 480.) If, after Plaintiffs told Howell during this second 
meeting that they had made their Atlas Capital investment, Howell anticipated that 
Plaintiffs would be receiving a promissory note, that shows, at most, that Howell either 
had enough experience generally to expect promissory notes in such investment 
situations or had assisted other clients who had received Atlas Capital promissory notes. 
It does not show that Howell knew Atlas Capital was a Ponzi scheme or that Howell 
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participated in that scheme. The district court correctly ruled that this evidence fails to 
show that Howell knew about or participated in the alleged scheme. (R. 646.) 
Plaintiffs' argument that Howell's expertise and estate planning work lent 
credence to the scheme, in which Plaintiffs otherwise would not have invested, is 
similarly unavailing. (Aplt's Br. at 14-15 ,r 39.) The same could be said of any attorney 
to whom Cynthia decided to refer Plaintiffs, or who set up Plaintiffs' estate, regardless of 
whether such attorney knew about and participated in some purported scheme. It 
certainly is not evidence that Howell knew about or participated in any scheme, or that 
Howell did anything other than what Plaintiffs-his clients-asked him to do, and what 
any other competent attorney would have done in the circumstances. 
The sole case Plaintiffs cite is an example of the direct association that Plaintiffs 
would have to show between Howell and the purported Ponzi scheme before holding 
Howell liable. See Bolson, 2007 UT App 268, ,r,r 17-18. In Bolson, the defendant 
actively participated in a Ponzi scheme by encouraging others to invest their money in 
"the Program." Id. ,r,r 2-3. The defendant was the contact person for the Program. 
Id. ,r 3. And, despite knowing of the Program's collapse, defendant "assured [investors] 
that the payments were forthcoming ... and that their investments were safe," and 
defendant encouraged additional investors to join the program, but "did not disclose the 
payment problems to these later investors." Id. ,r,r 7-8. The Bolson Court upheld the 
jury's conviction based on defendant's knowledge of and involvement in the Ponzi 
scheme. Specifically, Bolson's liability was confirmed because, ''despite knowing of the 
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payment problems and without disclosing her knowledge of the problems, Defendant 
assured later investors that there was no risk to their initial investments." Id. ,I 18. 
Plaintiffs here cannot prevail against Howell unless and until they can show that 
he knew about and participated in the alleged fraud-even if Plaintiffs ever could show 
that others engaged in a Ponzi scheme (which they cannot). Unlike in Bolson, there is no 
evidence here that Howell knew-or knows now-that Plaintiffs were investing in a 
purported Ponzi scheme, or that Howell participated in any way in such a scheme. And, 
distinguishing Howell even more from the defendant in Balson, the uncontroverted 
evidence in this case shows that Plaintiffs already had decided to invest in Atlas Capital 
before they even met Howell, that they made their investment before discussing it with 
Howell, and that Howell did not in any way induce Plaintiffs to make their investment 
with Atlas Capital. (See R. 313, 316-17, ,r,r 5, 17-30 (facts uncontroverted by Plaintiffs).) 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT 
PROVE DUTY, BREACH OR CAUSATION. 
Even on appeal, Plaintiffs still do not try to counter Howell's legal and evidentiary 
showing on summary judgment, or the district court's subsequent ruling, that Howell 
owed Plaintiffs no duty that he breached or that caused Plaintiffs' purposed losses. (See 
R. 317-22, 643-47.) By their silence and complete failure to offer any contrary evidence, 
Plaintiffs concede that they have no evidence, and can never prove, that Howell caused 
Plaintiffs' purported damages by breaching any duty owed to them. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
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56.8 Thus Howell and DJP are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. 
A. Howell Did Not Owe Plaintiffs a Duty to Protect Them from 
Their Investment Decisions. 
All of Plaintiffs' causes of action are based on Plaintiffs' untenable position that 
Howell should have saved Plaintiffs from themselves by offering unsolicited advice 
about the risks of Plaintiffs' investment with Atlas Capital. (See. e.g., R. 372 at 71:3-5 
("[H]e missed a big opportunity to warn us that we were about to do something that was 
by definition risky, borrowed money, unsecured Promissory Note.").) But an estate 
planning attorney, like Howell, has no duty to advise his clients about the soundness of 
the investments that are to be placed in the entities created by the estate planning 
attorney. After years of litigation, Plaintiffs still cannot cite to such a duty. As an 
attorney, Howell is not trained in investment advice, does not hold an investment advisor 
license, and never held himself out as an investment advisor, which is a distinct field 
from the practice oflaw. 
On the contrary, the Engagement Agreement identifies the limited duties that 
Howell assumed when he agreed to represent Plaintiffs for purposes of estate planning: 
''to provide [Plaintiffs] with advice and assistance in connection with your tax and estate 
planning." (R.551.) By the plain language of the parties' agreement, Howell did not 
owe Plaintiffs a duty to advise Plaintiffs concerning the risks of their investments. See 
8 The Court should ignore any arguments or issues Plaintiffs raise for the first time on 
reply. "It is well established that '[an appeals court] will not consider matters raised for 
the first time in the reply brief."' Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 UT 88, ii 21, 34 P.3d 
781 (quoting Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,, 9, 17 P.3d 1122); see also Smith v. 
Hales & Warner Const.. Inc., 2005 UT App 38, ~ 12 n.5, 107 P.3d 70 l (same). 
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also Utah R. Profl Conduct 1.2 (attorney has no duty to act beyond the scope of the 
representation, which may be limited by agreement). 
Moreover, Plaintiffs never asked Howell to analyze the investment to determine 
whether it was good or bad. (R. 368 at 56: 18-20; R. 438-39 at 48:25-49:9; R. 444 at 
71:1-8.) Plaintiffs never discussed with Howell whether their investment was good or 
bad, high risk or low risk, because they already had asked both Engenuity and Atlas 
Capital those questions and Plaintiffs believed what they had been told by their 
investment advisors-that the investment was low risk. (R. 371 at 65:19-25; R. 438 at 
48: 17-24; R. 451 at 97:23-25.) Plaintiffs admit they did not go to Howell, an estate 
planning attorney, for investment advice. (R. 366 at 45:24-46:1.) And Plaintiffs never 
told Howell they were relying on him for investment advice. (Id. at 46: 13-16.) There is 
no duty anywhere in the law requiring Howell to offer his unsolicited opinion about the 
risks of Plaintiffs' investments, nor is Howell qualified or licensed to do so. 
Because all of Plaintiffs' claims against Howell and DJP are based on the 
existence of a duty that does not exist, Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law and the 
Court should affirm summary judgment for Howell. 
B. Howell Did Not Breach Any Duty by Not Inserting Himself Into 
Plaintiffs' Investment Decisions. 
Plaintiffs' claims also fail for the simple reason that, after eight years of litigation, 
Plaintiffs have no evidence Howell did anything wrong. 
As shown in Section 11.C., supra, Howell did not know about any scheme to 
defraud Plaintiffs, Howell did not participate in any such scheme, and Howell did not 
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know then-and does not know now-that Plaintiffs were investing in a purported Ponzi 
scheme. Importantly, all of the evidence shows that others-not Howell-induced 
Plaintiffs to make their Atlas Capital investment, which Plaintiffs did before discussing 
the investment with Howell. 
Plaintiffs do not complain about the actions that Howell actually took. Plaintiffs 
have no complaint with the wills that Howell prepared. Plaintiffs have no complaint with 
the trusts that Howell created. Plaintiffs have no complaint with Howell's work in 
forming Morris Management LLC. Plaintiffs cannot even point to a single thing that any 
other attorney would have done that Howell did not, or that another attorney would not 
have done that Howell did, under the circumstances. The evidence shows that Howell 
did exactly what his clients requested. 
The district court correctly held that Howell did not breach a duty owed to 
Plaintiffs. (R. 646-47.) 
C. Howell Did Not Cause Plaintiffs' Investment Loss. 
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any of their claims against Howell because they cannot 
prove that anything Howell did, or did not do, was the but-for or proximate cause of 
Plaintiffs' purported injury. See, e.g., Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) 
("Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence (unbroken by 
an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result would 
not have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the 
facts that accomplish the injury." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Nelson v . 
. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996) ("The plaintiff must introduce evidence 
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which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the 
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such 
causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or 
conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the 
court to direct a verdict for the defendant.") (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, et al., PROSSER 
& KEETON ON THE LA w OF TORTS § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
All of Plaintiffs' purported losses are the result of Atlas Capital not making the 
contractually required payments to Plaintiffs under the Promissory Note. Plaintiffs have 
no evidence to show what caused those payments to cease. Plaintiffs would not be the 
first or the only people to have lost money in real estate or other investments during this 
period of the often-called Great Recession. There certainly is no evidence that Howell 
caused Plaintiffs' investment to falter. Plaintiffs admit that even if Howell had not done 
their estate plan, they still would have lost their money. (See, e.g., R. 376 ("Well, yes, 
we would have still lost our money.").) 
Indeed, there is no evidence that Howell even caused Plaintiffs to make their 
investment. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs made their investments 
based on the advice and confidence they initially obtained from their friends and 
colleagues Ray Hooper and Fremont Woodward. (See, e.g., R. 331, 333; R. 374 at 80:3-
8; R. 380 at 103:24-104:12; R. 383 at 115:13-22; R. 429 at 10:17-11:4.) The evidence 
also shows that Plaintiffs' made their investment based on the advice and counsel of 
Cynthia Clements ofEngenuity and Kyle Nelson of Atlas Capital. (See, e.g., R. 331-37; 
R. 361 at 25:6-10; R. 362 at 31:7-19; R. 373 at 76:20-24.) In fact, Plaintiffs made their 
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investment with Atlas Capital by November 9, 2006, more than a month before Plaintiffs 
told Howell they were making an investment. (R.315112; R. 591 (not disputing); see 
also R. 311, 480.) 
Howell could not possibly have been the cause of Plaintiffs' purported loss. The 
Court should uphold summary judgment for Howell and DJP on all of Plaintiffs' claims. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ALSO FAIL BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE UNIQUE ELEMENTS OF THOSE 
CLAIMS. 
Plaintiffs' continued failure to advance any argument or evidence in support of 
their fraud, malpractice or fiduciary duty claims, either to the district court or now on 
appeal, is fatal to those clainis, and the Court should affirm summary judgment for 
Howell. 
A. Plaintiffs' Fraud Claim Fails. 
To sustain a claim for fraud in Utah, Plaintiffs must have evidence to show: "(l) 
that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which 
was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, 
( 5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and ( 6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was 
thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage." Gold Standard, Inc., 915 
P.2d 1060, 1066-67. Before the district court and now on appeal, Plaintiffs do not try to 
satisfy any of those elements. 
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Instead, Plaintiffs' appeal contains a single paragraph listing alleged 
"misrepresentations and omissions" that purportedly were made to Plaintiffs. See Aplt's 
Br. at 17,J 49. Plaintiffs cite to no evidence to support any of those alleged facts, 
meaning the Court should ignore them altogether. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ,i 33 
(appellate courts "need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or 
supported by the record." (alterations, emphasis, citations, and internal quotations marks 
omitted)). More importantly, all of those purported misrepresentations were made by 
other people, and there is no evidence that any of those misrepresentations was made by 
Howell or involved Howell in any way. (See R. 594-95 ,i 6; R. 630; see also R. 382 at 
111: 15-112:25 (admitting Plaintiffs cannot identify a false representation made by 
Howell).) 
B. Plaintiffs' Malpractice Claim Fails. 
Whether based in contract9 or tort10, Plaintiffs' malpractice claim against Howell 
fails for the same reasons set forth in Sections I through III, supra. In addition, Plaintiffs' """ 
malpractice claim is based on three meritless assertions: "Mr. Howell failed to properly 
9 
"A legal malpractice action for breach of a promise is governed by rules of contract 
rather than rules of legal malpractice, and deals directly with the attorney's breach of a 
specified term in a contract between the attorney and the client, within the scope of the 
attorney-client relationship, that causes the client to suffer damages. To succeed, [a 
plaintiff] must demonstrate ( 1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) 
performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the express promise by the defendant; and (4) 
damages to the plaintiff resulting from the breach." Iacono, 2011 UT App 377, 1 17 
(internal citations, alterations and quotations omitted). 
10 
"The ... elements of legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty include ... : 
( 1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client; 
(3) causation, both actual and proximate; and ( 4) damages suffered by the client." 
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ,J 29. 
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advise the Morrises regarding [ 1] the import of their investment, [2] the terms and 
conditions of the promissory note prior to its execution, and [3] his numerous conflicts of 
interest in the transactions." (See R. 154 ,r 141.) There is no legal or factual support for 
these assertions. 
First, it is unclear what Plaintiffs mean by "the import of their investments," or 
what such advice would entail. But, as shown above, Plaintiffs cannot identify any duty 
for any attorney to offer unsolicited and unlicensed opinions about a client's investment 
decisions. See Section III.A, supra. Moreover, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs fully 
understood the "import of their investments." (See, e.g., R. 434 at 32:7-10 ("Well, it's a 
big investment. You want to make sure it's safe."). For that reason, Plaintiffs sought, 
obtained and relied on the advice of their investment advisors-not Howell-in making 
their investments. (See, e.g., R. 331-37;; R. 361 at 25:6-10; R. 362 at 31:7-19; R. 373 at 
76:20-24; R. 374 at 80:3-8; R. 380 at 103:24-104:12; R. 383 at 115:13-22; R. 429 at 
10:17-11:4.) 
Second, Plaintiffs never asked Howell to advise them regarding ''the terms and 
conditions of the promissory note prior to its execution." (R. 439 at 51 :21-23.) In fact, 
Plaintiffs did not discuss the terms of their Promissory Note with Howell, or even share 
the Promissory Note with him, until December 22, 2006-nine days after Plaintiffs 
received it and more than a month after Plaintiffs had made their investment with Atlas 
Capital. (R. 442 at 62:20-63:2.) An attorney does not have a duty to anticipate the terms 
of an agreement he has not seen or to offer unsolicited advice about contract terms that 
have not been shared with him. Moreover, Plaintiffs' grievances are not with the ''terms 
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and conditions" of the Promissory Note, but with Atlas Capital's failure to perform. 
Howell cannot be held liable for Atlas Capital's breach of contract. 
Finally, after years of litigation and discovery, Plaintiffs cannot identify a single 
conflict of interest that Howell had in representing Plaintiffs for estate planning purposes. 
Plaintiffs have alleged that Howell had a conflict of interest since they first filed their 
original complaint in August 2009. (R. 191120.) Plaintiffs' burden since then has been 
to prove the existence of an actual, concurrent conflict of interest resulting from "directly 
adverse" representation of multiple clients, or "a significant risk that the representation of 
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client." Utah R. Profl Conduct l .7(a). Eight years later, Plaintiffs still offer no 
argument or evidence that Howell had any such conflict of interest in helping Plaintiffs 
with their estate planning work. Howell did not represent Plaintiffs "in the[ir] 
transactions" with the other defendants, nor did Howell represent any of the other 
defendants "in the[ir] transactions" with Plaintiffs. Howell was an estate planning 
attorney who set up Plaintiffs' estate. (R. 516 at 29:16-21; R. 519 at 32:4-8; R. 522-23 at 
52:25-53:22.) He had no conflict of interest in doing so. (R. 646.) 
C. Plaintiffs' Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Fails. 
Plaintiffs never have indicated what fiduciary duty Howell breached or how he 
breached it, and there is no evidence that Howell breached any fiduciary duty that he 
owed to Plaintiffs. 
"[ A ]n attorney's fiduciary duty is not just some sort of amorphous duty out there 
to be a good attorney for your client," though the evidence shows that Howell was a good 
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attorney for his clients and diligently and accurately performed the estate planning tasks 
he was asked to perform. Iacono, 2011 UT App 3 77, ,r 16 (internal quotations omitted). 
Instead, the fiduciary duties owed by an attorney to a client are the duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality. See, e.g. Shaw Resources, 2006 UT App 313, ,r 28 (quoting Kilpatrick, 
909 P.2d 1283, 1290). Plaintiffs cite no evidence-and there is none-that Howell 
breached either of these duties in representing Plaintiffs. That Plaintiffs on appeal still 
have never identified which fiduciary duty they believe Howell purportedly breached is 
further evidence that Plaintiffs have not carried, and cannot carry, their burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth herein, Howell and DJP request that the Court 
affirm the decisions of the district court in their entirety. 
DATED this 12th day of October, 2016. 
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